
What industrial operators need to know about covered equipment, remote access, and supply chain risk.
Galvanick Opinion.
November 16th, 2026
Background
Federal contracting restrictions and maritime security directives have put equipment from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under increased scrutiny. For industrial operators, understanding how this applies to them requires knowing which devices are installed, how they communicate, and what access they have to operational systems.
Federal Contracting Restrictions On PRC Suppliers
Section 889, implemented through Federal Acquisition Regulation clause 52.204-25, restricts certain telecommunications and surveillance equipment and services from named PRC-based companies. It specifically calls out Huawei and ZTE for telecommunications equipment. It also covers video surveillance and telecommunications equipment from Hikvision, Hytera, and Dahua for use cases such as public safety, government facility security, and physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure. The restrictions include subsidiaries and affiliates of the named companies.
The restrictions apply when the specified equipment is necessary for a system to function properly or qualifies as critical technology under the rule. The named companies’ devices are not limited to government work and can affect equipment contractors use in other parts of their business. Exceptions and waivers may apply, and the rule does not ban every Chinese-made product.
Checking new purchases is only part of the review. Contractors also need to examine surveillance and communications equipment already in use to determine whether its manufacturer and use are restricted.
The Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act requirements in FAR clause 52.204-30 provide a broader mechanism that may apply when an order identifies a PRC supplier or product. Where the standard clause applies, contractors must check SAM.gov at least every three months, or as advised by the contracting officer.
Port Cranes and Remote Access
A 2024 congressional investigation found cellular modems supplied by PRC-based Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC) that were not included in equipment contracts on cranes. Although the public findings did not establish that those modems had enabled a cyberattack, their presence raised concerns about undocumented connections and potential access to port systems.
In November 2024, the Coast Guard also strengthened its requirements for PRC-manufactured ship-to-shore cranes through Maritime Security Directive 105-5. The objective was to prevent remote servicing, programming, and control capabilities from being exploited in ways that could disrupt port operations.
For a port reviewing this equipment, the practical questions are whether each connection is authorized, what it can reach, and how it is being used. Understanding the connections is critical because cellular modems can provide a separate connection into the environment that basic network monitoring may not see.
Understanding Behavior Alongside Origin
A device’s PRC origin does not prove it contains a backdoor, but applicable restrictions may still require action without evidence of compromise. PRC threat actors can also exploit equipment from other suppliers, making manufacturer information only one part of the risk assessment.
The Justice Department’s January 2024 disruption of the Volt Typhoon-linked KV Botnet illustrates why that matters. Attackers used compromised routers, mostly Cisco and Netgear devices that no longer received security updates, to conceal activity targeting critical infrastructure.
Unsupported equipment, unencrypted management traffic, and protocols without authentication can create opportunities for misuse. Knowing which systems rely on a device also helps teams assess what disconnecting or replacing it could disrupt.
Connecting Device Identity With Operational Context
Galvanick helps identify connected devices, including vendor, model, product series, and firmware where available. It correlates endpoint, network, infrastructure, and application telemetry so analysts can examine asset connections alongside processes and user activity.
That context supports investigations into attacker behaviors such as reconnaissance and lateral movement, helping teams identify affected systems and prioritize a response.
Speak with our team about identifying your industrial assets and understanding their connections, behavior, and exposure.
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